Stop chasing patch dates. Learn to check, fix, and mitigate Linux kernel vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-36347, EntrySign) on Ubuntu, Rocky, and SUSE. Includes a hands-on lab, automation script, and iptables fallback for admins who can't reboot now.
On April 17, 2026, Canonical released USN-8179-2 for Ubuntu 24.04 LTS FIPS kernels. It fixed over 100 CVEs, including the nasty EntrySign (CVE-2024-36347) — a flaw in AMD Zen microcode signature verification.
But here's the thing: if you only read that news, you learned nothing useful for next month's kernel panic. This guide turns that one-time alert into a repeatable playbook for any Linux kernel vulnerability.
2. How to Check If You Are Vulnerable (Actual Commands)
Run these on Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (with FIPS kernel):
# Check your current kernel version uname -r # For generic FIPS – vulnerable if lower than 6.8.0-110.110+fips2 # For AWS FIPS – vulnerable if lower than 6.8.0-1052.55+fips1 # For GCP FIPS – vulnerable if lower than 6.8.0-1054.57+fips1 # Quick check for EntrySign (AMD only) if grep -q "AMD" /proc/cpuinfo; then echo "AMD CPU present. Check microcode:" grep "microcode" /proc/cpuinfo | head -1 else echo "Not an AMD system – EntrySign not applicable" fi # See if your system has pending kernel updates apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | grep -E "linux-(image|headers)"
For Rocky Linux / AlmaLinux 9:
# Check kernel uname -r # Compare against https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2024-36347 dnf check-update kernel
For SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP5:
uname -r zypper list-updates | grep kernel
3. Automation Script to Apply the Fix (Bash – Major Distros)
#!/bin/bash # Evergreen kernel vulnerability fixer – Ubuntu, Rocky, SUSE # Usage: sudo bash fix-linux-kernel.sh set -e detect_os() { if [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then . /etc/os-release OS=$ID VER=$VERSION_ID else echo "Cannot detect OS. Exiting." exit 1 fi } backup_grub() { cp /etc/default/grub /etc/default/grub.backup.$(date +%Y%m%d) echo "Grub backup created." } update_ubuntu() { apt update apt upgrade -y linux-image-$(uname -r | cut -d- -f1)-fips linux-headers-$(uname -r | cut -d- -f1)-fips apt autoremove -y } update_rocky() { dnf update -y kernel kernel-devel kernel-headers } update_suse() { zypper refresh zypper update -y kernel-default kernel-devel } check_reboot_needed() { if [ -f /var/run/reboot-required ]; then echo "Reboot required. Run: systemctl reboot" else echo "No reboot flag found, but always reboot after kernel update." fi } main() { detect_os echo "OS detected: $OS $VER" backup_grub case $OS in ubuntu) update_ubuntu ;; rocky|almalinux|rhel) update_rocky ;; suse|opensuse-leap) update_suse ;; *) echo "Unsupported OS. Manual update required." exit 1 ;; esac echo "Kernel updated. Recompile third-party modules if any." check_reboot_needed } main
Make it executable
chmod +x fix-linux-kernel.sh sudo ./fix-linux-kernel.sh
4. Alternative Mitigation (If You Can't Update Now)
Sometimes you can't reboot – production, change freeze, whatever. Here's what you can do immediately without a reboot.
For EntrySign (AMD microcode) – No direct iptables fix, but you can limit local privilege escalation
# Restrict who can load microcode (requires reboot? no – but limits exposure) # Only allow root to write to microcode interface chmod 0600 /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload
General kernel memory corruption mitigation (works for many CVEs)
# Block SMB (445) if you don't need it – common kernel bypass target iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 445 -j DROP iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 445 -j DROP # Block unusual ICMP types (mitigates some IPv4/IPv6 kernel bugs) iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type 13 -j DROP # timestamp request iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type 17 -j DROP # address mask request # Save rules (Ubuntu/Debian) apt install iptables-persistent -y netfilter-persistent save
Using AppArmor to confine vulnerable kernel modules:
# Put a vulnerable driver (e.g., v4l2, btusb) in complain mode to log but not block aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/* 2>/dev/null # Then enforce only on critical paths aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.tcpdump
Using sysctl hardening (reduces kernel attack surface):
cat >> /etc/sysctl.d/99-kernel-hardening.conf << EOF # Disable bpf() for unprivileged users (kills many kernel exploits) kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 # Restrict kernel pointer access kernel.kptr_restrict=2 # Disable core dumps for setuid fs.suid_dumpable=0 EOF sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/99-kernel-hardening.conf
Suggested reding:
Why this matter ?
- How to build kernel modules that survive ABI bumps
- Debugging oops and panics after updates
- Writing secure modules (avoiding CVEs like the 100+ listed)

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